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Recent studies altering the host range of the H5N1 bird flu virus have refueled intense debates
over the potential misuse of academic life science research. To curtail the bioterrorism threat,
it has been suggested that dissemination of the research results and methodology should be
restricted. However, doubts have been raised over the suitability and effectiveness of this
measure. Using the H5N1 studies as an example, this paper summarizes the main arguments
of the debate. Particular attention is paid to the issue of the tacit knowledge required to replicate
published life science research results, which has so far received limited attention. Taking into
account the importance of tacit knowledge for life science research, it is argued that preventing
publication of the methodology does not decrease the threat of bioterrorism.
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1. Introduction
Since the anthrax attacks in 2001, the dual-use potential of
life science research has been intensely discussed. Fears of
published research ﬁndings serving as a blueprint for
building biological weapons have especially troubled US
policy-makers (Malakoff 2001). Initially, the term dual-use
applied to engineering and information technologies and
related knowledge that may be used for both peaceful and
military purposes with little or no modiﬁcation (Hall 1965;
Panel on Scientiﬁc Communication and National Security
1982). The rapid advances of life science research in recent
years have pushed its experiments, results, and related
technologies into the center of the dual-use debate.
Long before the misuse potential of life science research
received so much public attention, the development, pro-
duction and stockpiling by state actors of bacteriological
and toxic weapons had been banned internationally by the
1972 Bioweapons and Toxin Convention (BTWC).
However, the apparent ease with which life science know-
ledge develops and diffuses is perceived to have widened
the range of actors with the potential to develop bio-
weapons from state actors to non-state actors. The
anthrax attacks, and the failure to reinforce the BTWC
to include non-state actors in late 2001, raised doubts
over its effectiveness to address the current challenges
and initiated this controversial debate (McLeish and
Nightingale 2007; Tucker 2002).
The concerns have been publicly discussed after selected
scientiﬁc papers on pathogenic viruses were published,
including a paper on an engineered mousepox virus that
overcomes vaccine protection (Jackson et al. 2001), a pub-
lication describing the ﬁrst de novo synthesis of a pathogen
(the poliovirus) (Cello et al. 2002), a study identifying
virulence factors that distinguish the causative agent of
smallpox, variola virus, from its close relative, vaccina
virus (Rosengard et al. 2002), a paper characterizing the
reconstructed 1918 Spanish inﬂuenza pandemic strain
(Tumpey et al. 2005), and recent studies on mutated
versions of the H5N1 bird ﬂu (Herfst et al. 2012b; Imai
et al. 2012). To prevent deliberate misuse of such published
knowledge, there have been calls for tighter regulations
and restrictions on academic research and the dissemin-
ation of research results (Tucker 2002; Wallerstein 2002,
Resnik and Shamoo 2004; Gaudioso and Salerno 2004;
van Aken 2006). In addition, a variety of international
and local policy measures have been implemented. For
example, the US government has deﬁned a list of ‘select
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agents’ with the potential to pose a severe threat to both
human and animal health, to plant health, or to animal
and plant products.1 US government regulations control
research with, and transfer of, these ‘select agents’.2
Further measures include: publication guidelines for
journals to pre-screen potentially sensitive publications
(Atlas et al. 2003), US government oversight of research
projects and possible classiﬁcation of sensitive research,3
the implementation of screening guidelines for synthetic
DNA orders from ofﬁcial providers for sequences
encoding select agents and toxins,4 and the establishment
of codes of conduct for scientists.5
In an attempt to address concerns over life science
research and to ﬁnd a formal deﬁnition of dual-use
research, the US National Academies published the
highly inﬂuential report ‘Biotechnology Research in an
Age of Terrorism’ (National Research Council 2004).
The so-called Fink report6 deﬁnes dual-use research of
concern (DURC) as:
. . . research that, based on current understanding, can be
reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, products, or
technologies that could be directly misapplied to pose a
threat to public health and safety, agricultural crops and
other plants, animals, the environment, or material.
In addition, the report deﬁned seven categories of ‘experi-
ments of concern’ to be scrutinized when designing research
programs and publishing sensitive results. These include:
(1) to render a vaccine ineffective
(2) to create resistance to therapeutically useful antibi-
otics or antiviral agents
(3) to enhance the virulence of a pathogen or render a
non-pathogen virulent
(4) to increase the transmissibility of a pathogen
(5) to alter the host range of a pathogen
(6) to enable the evasion of diagnostic/detection
modalities
(7) to enable the weaponization of a biological agent or
toxin
This paper will outline that categorizing and focusing on
‘dangerous technologies and pathogens’ reﬂects a limited
perspective on the dual-use dilemma. As McLeish and
Nightingale (2007) pointed out, an unambiguous deﬁnition
of ‘dangerous’ cannot be agreed upon as this:
. . . is not a descriptive term that denotes the property of some-
thing but an expressive term that refers to how we think about
the possible implications of the properties of something.
As a result, different people, even experts, will evaluate the
dangerousness of technologies and pathogens differently.
This is reﬂected by the current discourse around two
studies on the highly virulent H5N1 bird ﬂu virus.
Researchers have mutated the virus so that it can spread
amongst mammals via aerosol (Herfst et al. 2012b; Imai
et al. 2012). However, as no human studies are desirable,
any attempts to determine the pandemic potential of the
virus remain speculative. It is this unknown potential, or
in other words, our ignorance about the implications of
releasing the virus into the environment, that leads to the
disagreement amongst virology experts on whether the
mutated H5N1 virus and the related experiments can
truly be termed ‘dangerous’ (Palese and Wang 2012;
Bouvier 2012; Inglesby et al. 2011; Morens et al. 2012).
With this in mind, a ﬁxed list of ‘dangerous technologies
and pathogens’ and ‘experiments of concern’, although
helpful, appears to be of limited use to deﬁne which type
of research may pose a threat to public health and safety.
A more ﬂexible perspective on dual-use technology and
‘dangerous science’ is needed to ensure that policy
measures keep up with the rapid developments in life
science research and secure the beneﬁts of academic
research. This different perspective on the development
of life science research and its impact on the dual-use
debate has been discussed amongst sociologists (McLeish
and Nightingale 2007; Vogel 2008; Tucker 2011).
However, it has not yet found its way into the public
debate over dual-use research. By using the controversially
debated H5N1 studies as a case study, this paper will em-
phasize the impact of an alternative perspective on the
dominant biosecurity discourse and highlight how an
alternative view of ‘dangerous’ life science research may
alter the prioritization of policy responses.
Furthermore, in the light of an alternative perspective,
this paper will evaluate the effectiveness of one key policy
measure: restricting dissemination of the research method-
ology. It has been argued that the potential dangers and
disastrous consequences of academic research demand the
implementation of precautionary measures such as restrict-
ing publication (Osterholm and Relman 2012; Kuhlau
et al. 2011; Resnik 2013). Thus, besides outlining a differ-
ent perspective on the potential dangers of dual-use life
science research, this paper will summarize the main argu-
ments of the dual-use debate around the H5N1 case and
make use of the precautionary principle (PCP) to evaluate
whether preventing publication of the methodology of
DURC is an effective tool to decrease the bioterrorism
threat.
2. Research on highly virulent, possibly
human transmissible, H5N1 influenza
virus strains
Two recent studies on the H5N1 bird ﬂu have intensiﬁed
the international debate over DURC. They describe a set
of mutations necessary for the highly virulent H5N1 bird
ﬂu virus to transmit amongst mammals, possibly humans
(Herfst et al. 2012b; Imai et al. 2012). The H5N1 case
raised concerns for several reasons: the bird ﬂu virus is
highly virulent, it is listed on the select agent and toxin
list, and the performed experiments can be allocated to
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category 5 (to alter the host range of a pathogen) of the
Fink report.
When submitted to the journals Nature and Science for
publication, the editors referred the two studies to the
National Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB).
Established by the US government as a result of the
Fink report, the NSABB provides advice, guidance and
leadership regarding biosecurity oversight of DURC in
the USA.7 Its decisions are, however, not legally binding.
For the ﬁrst time, the NSABB had voted against the pub-
lication of the methodological details in order to prevent
‘those who would seek to do harm’ from replicating the
experiment.8 The board had concluded that the harms of
fully publishing these results exceeded the beneﬁts of pub-
lication (Berns et al. 2012). Two crucial aspect may have
inﬂuenced the board’s so far unique decision: the ofﬁcial
World Health Organization estimate for the case fatality
rate of H5N1 avian inﬂuenza of around 60% (Beigel et al.
2005)9, and misunderstandings of technical details
(Morens et al. 2012).10 Hence, fears of potentially disas-
trous consequences for public health resulting from an
unintended or intended release of the engineered H5N1
strains were particularly strong (Berns et al. 2012).
To allow time for evaluating the risks and beneﬁts of the
research, the inﬂuenza research community proposed a
three-month voluntary moratorium11 on research
involving highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza H5N1.
During that time, the pros and cons of publishing the
manuscripts were intensely discussed by scientiﬁc and
security experts, the NSABB, the WHO and the US gov-
ernment. Finally, a majority vote of 6 to 1212, strongly
opposed by the NSABB member Michael
T. Osterholm,13 led to the revision of the NSABB’s
decision resulting in full publication of the two papers
(Herfst et al. 2012b; Imai et al. 2012). The research mora-
torium proposed by the inﬂuenza community was
extended beyond the originally proposed three months to
provide time for further evaluation of biosafety14 and
biosecurity15 concerns (Fouchier et al. 2012a). The
research ﬁnally commenced one year later in January
2013 (Fouchier et al. 2013).
3. To publish or not to publish?
Fouchier and Kawaoka, the two corresponding authors
of the studies, defended conducting, publishing and
continuing the work on mammalian transmissible H5N1
virus strains by emphasizing the beneﬁts of their work
and by stressing the importance of their research for
pandemic preparedness. Their proof-of-principle experi-
ments show that few mutations could enable the virus
to be transmitted via aerosols amongst mammals,
possibly humans, while maintaining virulence (Herfst
et al. 2012b; Imai et al. 2012). According to the authors,
the study highlighted the need to monitor H5N1 outbreaks
in poultry with more urgency, to implement more
aggressive control programs, and to adapt current
pandemic preparedness plans (Kawaoka 2012; Fouchier
et al. 2012a, 2013).
However, the NSABB experts had initially decided that
the beneﬁts of the study would not outweigh the risks of
publication (Berns et al. 2012). The main risks in publish-
ing both papers in full were described as twofold. First, the
results and methodology of the H5N1 studies, if published,
could be directly misapplied by others to pose a threat to
public health and safety (biosecurity risk). In particular,
the possibility of synthesizing the ﬂu mutant strains based
on published sequences and the identiﬁed mutations raised
concern. The NSABB members Osterholm and Relman
argued that:
. . . reverse engineering and synthesizing a mutant A/H5N1
virus strain will be easier for many scientists if they have
access to the complete methods and results of the two
research efforts and do not need to surmise the steps of the
investigators. (Osterholm and Relman 2012)16
Second, research with the virus could result in an uninten-
tional release into the environment (biosafety risk).17 In
order to mitigate the biosecurity and biosafety risks
associated with publication, the board had suggested
redacting the papers and excluding any description of the
methodology (Berns et al. 2012). However, the effective-
ness of partially restricting or even preventing publication
was repeatedly questioned.
The main argument used in favor of publishing the
research in full was the necessity to share the research
results in the wider scientiﬁc community to ensure free
and open science. Withholding the methodology has
been criticized as unethical, and as an assault on the
openness, accessibility and quality of scientiﬁc research
(Bouvier 2012; Racaniello 2012). It was argued that
omitting the methods from the manuscripts presents a
barrier for researchers to engage in further research
thereby limiting the scientiﬁc output essential to combat
the natural pandemic threat of inﬂuenza viruses (Palese
and Wang 2012; Morens et al. 2012; Kawaoka 2012;
Perez 2012; Faden and Karron 2012; Casadevall and
Shenk 2012). In contrast, it was claimed that, although
the results are valuable, publishing the results would not
bring about any additional beneﬁt for pandemic prepared-
ness as resources to detect the virus and support programs
for a number of the H5N1 endemic countries are often
lacking (Osterholm and Relman 2012).
Furthermore, it was argued that publishing the papers
in full may result in more laboratories working with the
virus, possibly some with insufﬁcient safety standards,
thereby increasing the chance of an unintentional release
(Inglesby et al. 2011; Osterholm and Henderson 2012).
Other opponents of publishing claimed that sharing the
results and methodology with a small group of selected
experts would be sufﬁcient to secure beneﬁcial outcomes
(Osterholm and Relman 2012; Fouchier et al. 2012b).
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This has been rejected for the same reasons as restricting
publication (Morens et al. 2012). It was also criticized on
the grounds that, while providing a main barrier to
research, the measure would be futile in the long term,
given that the methodology can be found in virology
textbooks (Palese and Wang 2012; Morens et al. 2012;
Perez 2012; Herfst et al. 2012a) (for a summary of the
arguments see Table 1).
4. DURC and the precautionary principle
Several groups, including the WHO and the NSABB, have
proposed adopting risk–beneﬁt analysis when addressing
DURC issues.18 This recommendation has been followed
throughout the discourse around the H5N1 studies.
However, as pointed out by Andrew Stirling, a risk
expert, under conditions of uncertainty and ignorance
risk–beneﬁt analysis fails (Klinke et al. 2006; Stirling and
Scoones 2009). It is traditionally used for routine risks,
when the possible outcomes and their respective
probabilities are known.
With regards to the H5N1 case, especially at the time of
publication, the likelihood with which the risks and
beneﬁts of the research will come to pass is unknown.
For example, to estimate the likelihood of misuse one
needs access to information on the degree of training,
intentions, ﬁnancial, and personnel resources of potential
bioweaponeers. Such knowledge is, however, not publicly
available. It will be held by intelligence and security
experts, if anyone has access to it at all (Selgelid 2009).
Furthermore, as Rappert (2008) pointed out, risk and
beneﬁts will be open to a considerable amount of interpret-
ation. This is reﬂected in the discourse on the H5N1 case.
For example, experts do not agree on how ‘dangerous’ the
mutated virus would be to human health, because data
from the ferret model cannot be directly extrapolated to
the human context (Bouvier 2012; Racaniello 2012; Fauci
and Collins 2012).
Table 1. H5N1 debate: Summary of arguments for and against publication of research methodology
Pro publishing Reference Contra publishing Reference
Beneﬁts for pandemic
preparedness: public health
threat of H5N1 strains
(mammalian transmission,
maintenance of virulence),
enables monitoring of current
H5N1 strains for critical
mutations, need for
enhancement of current
preparedness plans ‘Nature is
more inventive than men’
Fouchier et al. 2012b; Herfst et al. 2012a;
Perez 2012; Palese and Wang 2012;
Kawaoka 2012; Morens et al. 2012
Knowing the results (mutations)
is sufﬁcient (no enhancement
of disease surveillance or
countermeasure availability
expected in the near future)
Osterholm and
Relman 2012
Accessibility of the methodology
through textbooks and other
open sources such as published
papers
Herfst et al. 2012a; Perez 2012; Palese and
Wang 2012; Morens et al. 2012
Access to the complete methods
and results makes it easier for
scientists to synthesize a mutant





Need for trained experts and
high-tech research facilities to
replicate results
Palese and Wang 2012; Racaniello 2012;
Fouchier 2012
Replication not difﬁcult in
technological terms
Zimmer 2012
Sharing the results in the wider
scientiﬁc is a basic requirement
for scientiﬁc endeavor (value
of free science)
Racaniello 2012; Bouvier 2012 Sufﬁciency of sharing the results
with a small group of selected








Prerequisite for ensuring quality
of scientiﬁc research by enabling
post-publication peer-review and
replication (value of high quality
in science)
Bouvier 2012
Barrier for researchers to continue




Perez 2012; Palese and Wang 2012;
Kawaoka 2012; Morens et al. 2012;
Bouvier 2012; Faden and Karron 2012;
Casadevall and Shenk 2012
Encouragement for more labs
to initiate dual-use research
on H5N1 (increase of the
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In order to address the challenges associated with
DURC, the bioethicists Kuhlau et al. (2011) have
proposed to make use of the PCP as a ‘rule of choice’
with regards to DURC:
When and where serious and credible concern exists that
legitimately intended biological material, technology or know-
ledge in the life sciences pose threats of harm to human health
and security, the scientiﬁc community is obliged to develop,
implement and adhere to precautious measures to meet the
concern.
Correspondingly, the NSABB members Osterholm and
Relman have, in the light of the potentially disastrous
consequences associated with the release of a human trans-
missible H5N1 virus, suggested to err in favor of ‘do no
harm’. They proposed to make:
. . . use of the precautionary principle when approaching the
issue of DURC. (Osterholm and Relman 2012)
The PCP is designed for making practical decisions under
uncertainty when no reliable quantitative data is available.
It was originally created as a way to respond to environ-
mental risks (Goklany 2001). For example, the PCP has
been used to address issues such as: global warming, in-
tensive dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT)19 use, and
the commercialization of genetically modiﬁed food. The
principle has often been criticized for being too vague,
overly risk-averse and an unscientiﬁc approach to
decision-making due to a lack of a scientiﬁc basis
(Brombacher 1999; Gray and Bewers 1996). Contrasting
this critique, risk experts argue that under conditions of
uncertainty,20 ignorance21 and ambiguity22 sound scientiﬁc
methods of risk assessment have in any case little justiﬁca-
tion (Stirling 2007; Hoffman-Riem and Wynne 2002). It is
under these conditions that the PCP can be viewed as a
general normative guide for policy-makers to acknowledge
the beneﬁt of doubt (Stirling 2007).
The critique of the PCP may also be related to the fact
that the principle does not deﬁne which types of hazards it
applies to, what level of (scientiﬁc) evidence is required,
which preventive measures should be taken and with
what force they are recommended (Sandin et al. 2002).
However, Sandin, a bioethicist, argues that the PCP does
not contradict science and has recommended establishing
the following criteria when deciding whether to use the
PCP (Sandin et al. 2002; Sandin 2009):
An action A is precautionary with respect to something
undesirable U, if and only if 1) A is performed with the
intention of preventing U, 2) the agent does not believe it to
be very likely that U will occur if A is performed, and 3) the
agent has externally good epistemic reasons a) for believing
that U might occur, b) for believing that A will in fact at
least contribute to the prevention of U, and c) for not believing
that it to be certain or very likely that U will occur if A is
performed.
Along these lines, Resnik (2003) argues that:
. . . the principle can be scientiﬁc provided that (1) the threats
addressed by the principle are plausible threats, and (2) the
precautionary measures adopted are reasonable.
He proposes to use epistemic criteria to determine whether
a threat is plausible and to use practical considerations to
determine whether a response to a threat is reasonable.
Considering the ignorance of risks and beneﬁts
associated with DURC studies such as the H5N1
research, the PCP could be a useful tool to analyze the
reasonableness of preventing or banning the publication
of results and methods as a precautionary measure.
When applying the PCP using Resnik’s and Sandin’s
framework, there are two main questions to answer.
First, how plausible are the threats associated with pub-
lishing the H5N1 studies? Second, is censorship a reason-
able mean to address the threat and prevent possible
negative consequences?
In order to determine whether publishing the H5N1
papers in full presents a reasonable threat, one needs to
discuss whether the engineered H5N1 strain could, in prin-
ciple, cause a disastrous pandemic and whether the H5N1
publications could easily be misused by those who seek to
do harm. In this context, the PCP does not specify the
degree of scientiﬁc evidence required to determine what
a reasonable threat might be. To solve this issue, Sandin
et al. (2002) proposed to use a degree of evidence in
qualitative terms such as ‘scientiﬁcally supported strong
suspicions’ to evaluate the threat.
Thus, what is the scientiﬁc evidence supporting the sus-
picion that engineered H5N1 strains could pose a reason-
able threat to human health? To begin with, it is true that
the H5N1 virus infects humans, although transmission
between humans remains limited (Yang et al. 2007).
Another source of concern is the ofﬁcial mortality rate of
about 60% (Beigel et al. 2005).23 Virology experts, such
as Palese, Bouvier, and Taubenberger believe the rate to be
overestimated (Bouvier 2012; Palese and Wang 2012).24
The true case fatality rate of the unmodiﬁed H5N1 virus
is estimated to be between 1% and 33% (Li et al. 2008;
Morens et al. 2012). In comparison, the fatality rate of the
1918 pandemic virus was estimated to be 2.5% (Li et al.
2008). The worst human inﬂuenza pandemic in history so
far, raged from 1918 to 1919 and claimed an estimated
50 million lives (Taubenberger and Morens 2006).
However, even if the true mortality rate of the mutant
virus strains was much below the rate of the 1918 virus,
pandemic spread of a deadly H5N1 variant would be a
cause for signiﬁcant public health concern.
Further data comes from the animal model in which
human inﬂuenza viruses cause inﬂuenza-like illness
(Maher and DeStefano 2004). Ferrets are susceptible to
infection with the mutated H5N1 virus. According to the
two studies, the virus can be transmitted amongst ferrets
via aerosol while maintaining virulence (Herfst et al.
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2012b; Imai et al. 2012). Hence, the mutant virus has the
potential to infect and spread amongst humans. However,
it should be noted that the results of these infection studies
cannot be used directly to predict the transmissibility and
pathogenicity of the virus in humans (Bouvier 2012;
Morens et al. 2012; Racaniello 2012; Fauci and Collins
2012).
In conclusion, the threat is plausible: it is possible that
the virus could cause a pandemic that would be devastat-
ing to the world’s population, although there is no (and
there will not be) concrete scientiﬁc evidence available.
Next, the second question needs to be answered: is pre-
venting or restricting publication a reasonable response
to the threat of misuse? Would it signiﬁcantly contribute
to the prevention of the feared consequences?
5. The role of tacit knowledge
Many scientists have argued that preventing publication
of the results and methodology does not prevent misuse.
They argued that even if the methodology was omitted
from the paper, an individual with the relevant training
would be able to repeat the experiments. For example,
Fouchier and colleagues, stated that their methodology
can be found in many virology textbooks (Herfst et al.
2012a):
Individuals with bad intentions do not need to read the details
in our manuscript because the methods for creating similar
viruses have already been published widely.
A similar argument was used by Wimmer (2006):
. . . all methods used for the synthesis of poliovirus were pub-
lished long before the experiment was conceived. Thus, we
neither described new technologies to synthesize DNA nor
invented novel methods to convert cDNA into infectious
viral RNA.
This argument contrasts the current discourse about
DURC, which assumes a direct correlation between
technological advances in the life sciences and an increased
threat of bioterrorism. By focusing on the ease of diffusion
of knowledge and technologies, socio-technical aspects of
biotechnology such as tacit knowledge, complexity and
contingency are overlooked and possible challenges are
disregarded, thus leading to the perception of an increased
threat (Vogel 2008). Moreover, relying on this linear model
of technical change may lead to a false prioritization of
policy measures and an inappropriate focus on high-tech
research (McLeish and Nightingale 2007; Vogel 2008;
Leitenberg 1999).
Chyba (2006) has compared the rapid development of
life science technologies to the evolution of computer
power. He argued that the pace of development will
make DNA synthesis and other biotechnologies increas-
ingly available to individuals with only basic scientiﬁc
skills. This view was repeatedly presented in media
reports covering the H5N1 case, for example by the New
York Times (Zimmer 2012).
Indeed, as has been pointed out, life science research has
evolved rapidly over the past decades. The emergence of
gene technology, the development of high-throughput
DNA synthesis and DNA sequencing machines, the com-
pletion of the human and other genome projects have sig-
niﬁcantly enhanced research efﬁciency and opened new
possibilities. However, by taking this view, two important
aspects are overlooked. First, it ignores the signiﬁcant
ﬁnancial means and trained specialists required to operate
these new technologies. For example, to ensure constant
access to this vital scientiﬁc and technological expertise
and to help to rationalize institutional resources, more
and more so-called ‘core service facilities’ are being estab-
lished at major universities with a life science focus (Sa
2008).25 Those facilities are operated by staff scientists
with various backgrounds and expert training ranging
from bioinformatics to molecular biology, chemistry and
engineering.
Second, the non-technological component of research is
overlooked. In addition to sophisticated machines and
technologies, there are many more steps involved when
performing life science research. These often require very
speciﬁc expertise and technical skills of the individual re-
searcher that can only be learned through constant
practice and observation of peers. Hence, even if ‘labora-
tory processes have become more automated’ as Chyba
(2006) pointed out, it does not follow that ‘less and less
tacit knowledge is needed’ to conduct life science research.
Tacit knowledge was, and still is, an important factor not
only for the success of life science research, but for science
and technology in general.
The term tacit knowledge was ﬁrst coined by Polanyi
who deﬁned it as:
. . . things that we know but cannot tell. (Polanyi 1962)
Since the 1960s much research has been done on the
concept of tacit knowledge. Different forms have been
deﬁned including somatic-limit and collective tacit know-
ledge,26 which are widely accepted, for example in the ﬁeld
of economics, psychology, and education.
Scholars have attempted to describe and measure the
impact of tacit knowledge on the success of academic
endeavors and the translation of academic knowledge into
industrial applications (Leonard and Insch 2005; Somech
and Bogler 1999; Zucker et al. 2002). For example, Harry
M. Collins, a social scientist, has presented an insightful
analysis of the importance of tacit knowledge for scientiﬁc
research in physics (Collins 2001). He described the attempt
of Western researchers to repeat experimental results pub-
lished by Russian scientists during the Cold War. Only in
the 1990s, after closely observing how the experiments were
performed, did the Western researchers succeed in
replicating the results. Collins drew the following
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conclusions from his ﬁeld observations: In order to success-
fully replicate an experimental result, researchers ﬁrst have
to understand and acknowledge the importance of tacit
knowledge. Second, they have to trust the validity of the
results, and third they need to know how difﬁcult a proced-
ure is, meaning how much patience with trial and error is
required (Collins 2001).
The concept of tacit knowledge has not yet gained much
attention in the biosecurity debate within life science
research. Tucker (2011) and Vogel (2008) are among the
few who have highlighted the importance of tacit know-
ledge used by life scientists during experimentation. In the
context of life science research, Tucker (2011) deﬁnes ‘tacit
knowledge’ as knowledge:
. . . that cannot be transmitted in writing but must be gained
through years of hands-on experience in the laboratory.
Tacit knowledge plays, as Tucker (2011) recognizes, a
central role when aiming to determine the biosecurity
risks associated with life science research.
One of the few studies on tacit knowledge in the life
sciences has been conducted by Kathleen Vogel. It
involved members of the Wimmer group who published
the ﬁrst de novo synthesis of a virus (Cello et al. 2002;
Vogel 2008). The group revealed that the most difﬁcult
part of the poliovirus synthesis was not the partially auto-
mated DNA synthesis. Instead, it was the construction of
the virus: the production of the virus components, the
assembly of those components into virus particles, and
ﬁnally the incorporation of the virus’ synthetic genetic
material. According to the group, these steps, although
around for more than 20 years ‘. . . require specialized la-
boratory know-how and practices only obtained by
training, care, and attention to detail [and are difﬁcult
even for experienced researchers] (Vogel 2008). That the
reconstruction or recovery of a pathogen would currently
require someone ‘skilled in the art’ has been supported by
other experts including the NSABB Working Group on
Synthetic Genomics.27 In the context of the H5N1
studies, Palese and Wang argue that the generation of en-
gineered H5N1 based on the published raw sequence
would require:
. . . (i) access to a sophisticated laboratory setting, (ii) proﬁ-
ciency in relevant concepts of molecular biology, and (iii) ex-
perience with laboratory methods related to viruses. (Palese
and Wang 2012)
The author of one of the criticized H5N1 studies has used a
similar argument:
It takes a lot of knowledge, together with perhaps ten years of
training and a well-equipped high containment lab, even to
reproduce our work. (Fouchier 2012)
In his simplistic portrait of biotechnology research,
Chyba (2006) nevertheless raised an important question:
Why is it that modern bioterrorist attacks28 have been so
rare? Could the lack of capabilities be a main reason?
Previous studies on failed and successful attempts to
develop bioweapons provide possible answers. Two
studies illustrating the impact of socio-technical aspects
on bioweapons have been presented by Ouagrham-
Gormley and Vogel (2010) and by Leitenberg (1999).
Ouagrham-Gormley and Vogel (2010) show that a
substantial part of the Soviet smallpox bioweapon devel-
opment program was unable to create a workable biolo-
gical weapon even though they had substantial expertise,
resources, time, infrastructure and even detailed protocols
at their disposal. They highlight:
. . . the local and personal character of bioweapons know-
ledge, specialized skills, and scientiﬁc know-how, which
cannot be transferred easily from one person to another and
from one location to another. (Ouagrham-Gormley and Vogel
2010)
They also concluded that depending on the social context,
tacit knowledge plays an important role not only on the
individual, but also on the communal level (collective tacit
knowledge). As the most effective policy recommendation
to prevent former Soviet weaponeers working in the USA
from selling their knowledge, they suggested separating
them from one another in order ‘to allow the BW-related
skills to decay over time’.
Leitenberg, a security expert, reached a similar conclu-
sion on the importance of tacit knowledge for biological
weapons construction. Despite extraordinary ﬁnancial
resources, access to modern equipment, despite sufﬁcient
time and the fact that there were individuals with graduate
and postgraduate training amongst their members, the
religious Japanese Aum Shinrikyo group failed to
produce and disperse botulinum toxin or Bacillus anthracis
(Leitenberg 1999; Ballard et al. 2001). Leitenberg
concluded that:
. . . the experience of the Aum is therefore in marked contrast
to the legion of statements by senior US government ofﬁcials
and other spokesmen claiming that the preparation of biolo-
gical agents and weapons could be carried out in ‘kitchens’,
‘bathrooms’, ‘garages’, ‘home breweries’, and is a matter of
relative ease and simplicity.
In a related study from 1995, the sociologists McKenzie
and Spinardi (1995) highlighted the importance of socio-
technological aspects with regards to nuclear weapons
development. In their analysis based on interviews with
nuclear weapons designers and computing experts, they
emphasized that:
. . . tacit knowledge is also crucial to nuclear weapons
development.
Thus, the work of Ouagrham-Gormley and Vogel,
Leitenberg, and McKenzie and Spinardi indicates that:
. . .Because tacit knowledge is transmitted person to person,
there are greater barriers to the spread of competence than
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the traditional view might lead us to expect. (McKenzie and
Spinardi 1995)
Another aspect to be considered in this context is the
accessibility of bioweapons material. Rather than buying
state-of-the-art laboratory equipment and investing great
ﬁnancial resources and time to synthesize a virus from
scratch, pathogens more suited for a bioweapon could,
for example, be stolen or isolated from the wild and sub-
sequently modiﬁed to turn it into a category A bioterror-
ism agent as deﬁned by the US Center for Disease
Control29 (Herfst et al. 2012a; Tucker 2003). Moreover,
a study by Suk et al. (2011) suggests that instead of
‘high-tech’ activities, ‘low tech’ activities may be especially
attractive to bioterrorists:
Contamination of food and water, and direct injection/appli-
cation of a pathogen, all have much lower technical hurdles
and might be expected to be rather more successfully deployed.
Indeed, in 1984, followers of Bhagwan Shree Rajneeshee,
an Indian guru, deliberately contaminated salad bars at ten
restaurants in the USA with salmonella resulting in 754
individuals with food poisoning (Wheelis et al. 2006).
Furthermore, many scientists have pointed out that
although ferrets are a good model for human inﬂuenza
infection, the results may not be directly applicable to
humans as the potential for the transmission and lethality
of engineered H5N1 in humans is unknown (Bouvier 2012;
Morens et al. 2012; Racaniello 2012; Fauci and Collins
2012). Consequently, bioterrorists run the risk of discover-
ing that the mortality and transmission rates of the engin-
eered strains are comparable to a seasonal inﬂuenza after
having invested much time and resources in replicating the
H5N1 experiments.
Thus, it seems that attempting to replicate published
dual-use results may pose more challenges than the
common discourse reﬂects. Considering the importance
of tacit knowledge, an individual with only minimal
training should not be able to repeat the experiments
even if the methodology was published. The more
pressing question is how easily could a professional virolo-
gist replicate the results and produce sufﬁcient amounts of
the virus? First, withholding the methodology would likely
result in a need for more time for ‘trial and error’. Another
factor that comes into play is the form and length of the
methodology sections in papers. The explanations in such
sections are usually short and of limited depth due to space
limitations, besides only providing information on explicit
knowledge. Commonly, researchers exchange more
detailed protocols or even visit each other in their
laboratories to be able to replicate published results.
Furthermore, tacit knowledge may be essential for
translating or adapting technologies to a new environment,
not only on an individual level, but also on a communal
level (Ouagrham-Gormley and Vogel 2010). In summary,
depending on the degree of training and the tacit
knowledge needed to reproduce the experimental results,
the task may pose signiﬁcant hurdles even for specially
trained individuals.
Two possible conclusions can be drawn from this
analysis. Unskilled individuals or groups do not possess
the explicit and tacit knowledge currently needed to make
use of the published methodology of the H5N1 studies and
reproduce the results. On the other hand, omitting the
methodology would signiﬁcantly delay, but not prevent, a
skilled team of speciﬁcally trained scientists with the will,
enough time, the right equipment and sufﬁcient ﬁnancial
resources from replicating the H5N1 study results. With
this in mind, prohibiting dissemination of the methodology
could be regarded as ineffective in reducing the bioterror-
ism threat and as a result may be considered an unreason-
able response to the biosecurity threat of DURC.
6. Discussion
This paper outlines that prohibiting publication of the
methodology and results is not a reasonable response to
the uncertain biosecurity threat. It contrast a recent
analysis published by Resnik (2013) who argues that:
. . . re-dacted publication would have been a reasonable
response to the threats posed by the controversial H5N1
papers if not for practical and legal problems.
Resnik seems to support the common assumption that the
papers:
. . . provide terrorists with a recipe for making a bioweapon.
However, I would question that assumption and argue that
replicating the H5N1 experiments is not very easy for in-
dividuals or groups with minimal training, or even for
trained specialists. Neither is replicating the H5N1
studies the most suitable and easiest way to obtain a bio-
weapon. However, for individuals with specialty know-
ledge in inﬂuenza virology, this will not provide a real
barrier. With enough time and resources at hand, they
do not need to rely on the short methods section in the
H5N1 papers, but will be able to combine their expert
knowledge with textbook methodology in order to repli-
cate the experiments.
Although replicating the results of the H5N1 studies is
doable for trained individuals even without access to the
methodology, omitting this information will provide a
barrier for well-intentioned scientists. As the current
system of academic research is built on openness and the
exchange of study results, classiﬁcation of results and
potential funding cuts may divert scientists to other
research ﬁelds. Prohibiting publication may even impose
new risks. As Sandin et al. (2002) point out, the PCP
should also:
. . . be applied to precautionary measures prescribed by the
principle itself.
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Less scientiﬁc research may mean a lack of crucial know-
ledge for pandemic preparedness necessary to address
threats imposed by future natural humanH5N1 pandemics.
For example, the development of counter-measures (e.g.
vaccination) may be prevented, thereby precluding society
from obtaining the beneﬁt of the research. This is especially
worrisome as the prospective of beneﬁts for public health
are the motivation of such research and justiﬁcation for
public funding. In their analysis of the case, the bioethicists
Faden and Karron (2012) refer to a:
. . .moral obligation to ensure that the results of that research
are used to help reduce risks to global health.
There are further risks from limiting scientiﬁc openness. For
example, sharing the results is a prerequisite for responsible
conduct in science as peer review signiﬁcantly contributes to
ensuring the quality of the research and the research teams.
Preventing this mechanism might have a negative impact
on the quality of the research and thus may increase the
likelihood of viral escape from the laboratory.
Regarding the biosafety concerns associated with a
higher number of researchers working with the engineered
strains—this issue may better be solved through enhanced
biosafety regulations than through censoring the research,
given the potential negative implication of censorship.
Although it was discussed that enhanced Biosafety Level
3 (BSL 3) conditions are sufﬁcient (Casadevall aned Shenk
2012; Herfst et al. 2012a), Imperiale and Hanna (2012)
proposed using BSL4 conditions until more evidence is
available on the danger of the virus. A further biosafety
measure would be to plan ahead and use a less virulent
strain of the H5N1 virus. In fact, one of the two labs, in
which the controversial H5N1 studies have been per-
formed, did decide to use less virulent strains for their ex-
periments (Imai et al. 2012).
In contrast to censorship, education and personnel
screening to identify individuals with malicious intentions
may be more reasonable and effective measures to mitigate
biosecurity risks. For example in the USA, the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act
(PL107-188) from 2002 requires that persons seeking to
possess, use, or transfer agents and toxins listed on the
‘select agents and toxins’ list must undergo registration and
must have a legitimate need to handle or use such agents and
toxins.30 Finally, secrecy is an ineffective tool of prevention.
Before publication, the information on the H5N1 experi-
ments had been available to many scientists and the editors
of the two journals. Even if the US-based journal, Science,
had been forced to follow the original NSABB recommen-
dation to not publish the methodology, the UK-based
Nature could have (and did) proceed with publication.
There are many other journals and editors who do not fall
under US legislation and may be willing to publish such
manuscripts. Redaction of the papers would thus not be ef-
fective in reducting the threat as it would not prevent dissem-
ination of the sensitive knowledge.
This analysis does not conclude that we should ignore
the DURC problem, as it would not be a reasonable
response to the threat. Preventing terrorists and states
from using bioweapons is important. The DURC
problem calls for a more detailed investigation of the
biosafety and biosecurity risks associated with DURC
that includes a fact- and case-based assessment of the po-
tential for misuse. In this respect, the H5N1 papers could
be regarded as a wake-up call for the scientiﬁc community.
Although the dual-use issues associated with life science
research have been discussed for the last decade, the
H5N1 example illustrates how the restriction of research
funding and publication could become a reality in the near
future. In response to the H5N1 case, the US government
has issued a new policy that allows research funding pro-
posals sent to government agencies to be screened for
DURC. It also allows for the classiﬁcation of research
results and the restriction of funding of research that
raises concerns.31 However, how research proposals will
be evaluated, that is how risks and beneﬁts will be
assessed and who will evaluate the proposals, remains
unclear.32 Major differences in assessment of the term
‘dangerous’ in association with DURC might either
result in the underestimation of risks and threats or may
lead to the restriction of legitimate academic research.
Thus, it has become more important than ever for the
scientiﬁc community to address public concerns over
DURC by establishing a transparent governance sys-
tem (see Miller and Selgelid (2008) for an overview of
possible options).
Governance options that restrict and control access to
research results, as for example proposed by experts from
the Center for International and Security Studies at
Maryland (Steinbruner et al. 2007), may not be useful in
the light of the analysis presented above. For ensuring
oversight, the WHO has been suggested as an ideal gov-
ernance body (Fouchier et al. 2012b). However, based on
decades of experience with regulating smallpox research,
the WHO may not be the ideal choice to prevent deliber-
ate misuse of DURC due to ﬁnancial and political
dependencies and a strong inﬂuence of the pro-research
fraction (Tucker 2006).
Nevertheless, the scientiﬁc community has a duty to
consider the negative implications of their research and
thus must ﬁnd a way to address and possibly regulate
DURC issues (Kuhlau et al. 2008). As has been repeatedly
suggested, scientists should receive education in bioethics
and familiarize themselves with ‘experiments of concern’ as
deﬁned by the Fink report and the BTWC (Dando et al.
2008; Pearson and Mahaffy 2006; Rappert et al. 2006). If
possible, plans to mitigate potential risks, for example
intensiﬁed security measures and personnel training and
screening, must be prepared before the results of DURC
are communicated to the public.
However, scientists will not be able to ensure that their
research will never be misused. Thus, it is important that
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the research is conducted with the intention of beneﬁtting
the public. The peer review system of science, which can
only function if access to research result remains unre-
stricted, needs to ensure that only such research is sup-
ported. Furthermore, the potential beneﬁts of the
research need to be explained to the public as best as
possible. Media sensationalism should be contrasted by
facts. Scientists will need to explain in their papers, and
possibly with accompanying media campaigns, the rele-
vance and potential beneﬁts of their DURC to ensure
public understanding and support.
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Notes
1. The list includes a selection of viral, bacterial and
fungal species as well as toxins. An updated list of
select agents is accessible at <http://www.
selectagents.gov/select%20agents%20and%20toxins
%20list.html> accessed 11 September 2013.
2. Uniting and Strengthening America by providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act, 2001 Public
Law 107–56, and the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act, 2002.
3. National Institute of Health (2012) United States
Government Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences
Dual Use Research of Concern <http://oba.od.nih.
gov/oba/biosecurity/pdf/united_states_government_
policy_for_oversight_of_durc_ﬁnal_version_032812.
pdf> accessed 11 September 2013.
4. US Government, Screening Framework Guidance for
Synthetic Double-Stranded DNA Providers,
Department of Health and Human Services, Ofﬁce




5. The Interacademy Panel on International Issues, IAP
Statement on biosecurity, Trieste, Italy <http://www.
interacademies.net/File.aspx?id=5401> accessed 11
September 2013.
6. The report committee was headed by Professor Gerald
R. Fink, Professor of Genetics, Whitehead Institute,
MIT, Boston, MA.
7. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity
(2007), About NSABB <http://oba.od.nih.gov/
biosecurity/about_nsabb.html> accessed 11
September 2013.
8. National Institute of Health. Press statement on the
NSABB review of H5N1 research, 2011 <http://www.
nih.gov/news/health/dec2011/od-20.htm> accessed 11
September 2013.
9. World Health Organization. FAQs: H5N1 inﬂuenza,
Q1: What is H5N1? <www.who.int/inﬂuenza/human_
animal_interface/avian_inﬂuenza/h5n1_research/faqs/
en/> accessed 11 September 2013.
10. The Fouchier lab reported fatal infections of ferrets
following ‘intratracheal inoculation’ with the
mutated H5N1 virus (Herfst et al. 2012b). However,
intratracheal inoculation is a method that:
. . . is not directly relevant to viral transmissibility or
natural pathogenesis. [. . .] Inﬂuenza viruses that are
otherwise considered to be of low pathogenicity
often induce severe and even fatal disease in
animals when administered by this route. (Morens
et al. 2012: 336)
11. A moratorium can be deﬁned as a period of time
during which a certain activity is not allowed.
12. 14 April 2012, statement on NSABB’s recommenda-
tions to the National Institute of Health on H5N1




papers-process> accessed 11 September 2013.
14. Biosafety includes:
. . . containment principles, facility design, practices
and procedures to prevent occupational infections
in the biomedical environment or release of the
organisms to the environment. (Nordmann 2010)
15. Biosecurity can be deﬁned as:
. . . the sum of risk management practices in defense
against biological threats’, which includes aversion
of biological terrorism and other disease breakouts.
(Meyerson and Reaser 2002)
16. The press has also discussed how easily the results
could be replicated even by non-scientists (Zimmer
2012).
17. See <http://news.sciencemag.org/2012/04/ﬂawed-ﬂu-
papers-process> accessed 11 September 2013.
18. The World Health Organization (2010) stated that:
Just as scientists should weigh beneﬁts against
the risks when deciding which projects to pursue,
governments should be encouraged to do the same
when deciding which projects to fund.
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The NSABB (2007) stated that:
The NSABB will [. . .] develop guidelines for the
oversight of dual use research, including guidelines
for the risk-beneﬁt analysis of dual use biological
research and research results.
19. DDT was extensively used as an insecticide in agricul-
ture and for malaria control in the middle of the
20th century. Today, due to concerns over its potential
toxic side effects, intensive use of DDT is banned
worldwide.
20. Under the condition of uncertainty, possible outcomes
can be characterized, but the available information or
analytical models do not present a deﬁnitive basis for
assigning probabilities (Stirling 2007).
21. Under ignorance neither probabilities nor outcomes
can be fully characterized (Stirling 2007; Collinridge
1980).
22. Under the condition of ambiguity, outcomes are prone
to different interpretation and evaluation (Stirling
2007).
23. World Health Organization. FAQs: H5N1 inﬂuenza,
Q1: What is H5N1? (2012) <www.who.int/inﬂuenza/
human_animal_interface/avian_inﬂuenza/h5n1_
research/faqs/en/> accessed 11 September 2013.
24. The mortality rate is based on diagnostically conﬁrmed
cases of human H5N1 infections in hospitalized
patients in Southeast Asia. Due to a lack of epidemio-
logic and virologic studies and limited access to health
care in rural areas, mild forms of infection may likely
have passed undetected. Increased diagnostic efforts
have retrospectively identiﬁed previously undetected
asymptomatic infections (Beigel et al. 2005).
25. For example, the Functional Genomics Center Zurich,
a joint state-of-the-art research and training facility of
the ETH Zurich and the University of Zurich,
Switzerland, provides the latest technologies and
expert support in genomics, transcriptomics, prote-
omics, metabolomics, and bioinformatics <http://
www.fgcz.ch/> accessed 11 September 2013.
26. According to the social scientist Harry M. Collins,
somatic limit and collective tacit knowledge are
experienced and acquired by humans through immer-
sion in society and guided practice: Somatic-limit tacit
knowledge is deﬁned by the limited capacities and
particular nature of the human brain and body, and
collective tacit knowledge
has to be known tacitly, because it is located in
human collectivities and, therefore, can never be
the property of the any one individual. (Collins
2007)
27. NSABB. Addressing biosecurity concerns related to
the synthesis of select agents (2006) <http://oba.od.
nih.gov/biosecurity/pdf/Final_NSABB_Report_on_
Synthetic_Genomics.pdf> accessed 11 September
2013.
28. According to the US Center for Disease Control:
. . . a bioterrorism attack is the deliberate release of
viruses, bacteria, or other germs (agents) used to
cause illness or death in people, animals, or plants.
(<http://emergency.cdc.gov/bioterrorism/overview.
asp> accessed 11 September 2013)
29. The US Center for Disease Control separates bioter-
rorism agents into three categories, depending on how
easily they can be spread and the severity of illness or
death they cause. Category A agents are considered
the highest risk, because they can be easily spread or
transmitted from person to person, they result in high
death rates and have the potential for major public
health impact, they might cause public panic and
social disruption, and they require special action for
public health preparedness <http://emergency.cdc.
gov/bioterrorism/overview.asp> accessed 11
September 2013. With a few exceptions, there are
more steps required beyond the synthesis and replica-
tion or isolation of a particular pathogen in order to
use it as a bioweapon of category A, including stabil-
ization and dispersal of the pathogenic material
(Tucker 2003). For example, the pathogen Bacillus
anthraces could be isolated from the wild as it is still
endemic amongst cattle, e.g. in Equatorial Africa.
Infections are also sporadically detected in the USA
(see <http://www.vetmed.lsu.edu/whocc/mp_world.
htm> accessed 11 September 2013). However, viru-
lence varies amongst naturally occurring Bacillus
anthraces strains, and environmental conditions deter-
mine the stability and hence the infectiousness of
anthrax spores. Bioweaponeers would need to isolate
many strains to ﬁnd a suitable one, and would need to
stabilize the spores (Dragon and Rennie 1995). The
same would be true for naturally occurring H5N1
avian inﬂuenza strains, which would need to be
modiﬁed to adapt to humans as a host.
30. According to the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of
2002, Public Law 107–188, June 12, 2002, Sec. 351A,
pp. 637ff.
. . . the Secretary [. . .] shall include provisions to
ensure that persons seeking to register under such
regulations have a lawful purpose to possess, use,
or transfer such agents and toxins. [. . .] The
Secretary shall maintain a national database that
includes the names and locations of registered
persons, the listed agents and toxins such persons
are possessing, using, or transferring, and informa-
tion regarding the characterization of such agents
and toxins. [. . .] Requirements under paragraph (1)
shall include provisions to ensure that registered
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persons [. . .] deny access to such agents and toxins by
individuals whom the Attorney General has
identiﬁed as ‘restricted persons.’ Restricted persons
are deﬁned as individuals reasonably suspected of
‘committing a crime [. . .]’, individuals with
‘knowing involvement with an organization that
engages in domestic or international terrorism’ [. . .]
or ‘being an agent of a foreign power.’
31. The National Institute of Health (2012) US
Government Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences
Dual Use Research of Concern (<http://oba.od.nih.
gov/oba/biosecurity/pdf/united_states_government_
policy_for_oversight_of_durc_ﬁnal_version_032812.
pdf> accessed 11 September 2013). States that:
If the risks posed by the research cannot be
adequately mitigated with the measures above,
Federal departments and agencies will determine
whether it is appropriate to: [. . .] Classify the
research [. . .] Not provide or terminate research
funding.
32. The policy demands the following action for research
that involves certain agents and toxins as listed in the
document or/and if the research includes experiments
of concerns as deﬁned by the Fink report. In case of
such research it demands federal departments and
agencies to:
Assess the risks and beneﬁts of such projects,
including how research methodologies may
generate risks and/or whether open access to the
knowledge, information, products, or technologies
generates risk. (National’ Institute of Health (2012)
United States Government Policy for Oversight of
Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern
<http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/biosecurity/pdf/united_
states_government_policy_for_oversight_of_durc_
ﬁnal_version_032812.pdf> accessed 11 September
2013)
However, no further details are given.
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